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Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 51 (November 12, 2009) 1
FAMILY LAW – DEFAULT DIVORCE AND CHILD CUSTODY
Summary
Appeal from district court’s amended default divorce decree determining custody of the
parties’ three minor children and dividing community property. The Court decided three separate
issues in the appeal: (1) Whether the district court had home-state jurisdiction to make child
custody determinations under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act,
codified at NRS Chapter 125A; (2) Whether the district court properly held that Nevada served
as the children’s “habitual residence” and granted immediate return of the children, even though
Japan is not a signatory of Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction; (3) whether the district court properly entered the decree by default, notwithstanding,
that Shinichi, through counsel, answered the divorce complaint and filed a countercomplaint for
divorce?
Outcome
The Court answered the first question affirmatively holding the district court had homestate jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA), codified at NRS Chapter 125A. The Court also found the district court within its
authority to enter custody orders under UCCJEA. However, they noted the order is
unenforceable under the Hague Convention, since Japan is not a signatory. Nevertheless the
parties are free to pursue other remedies and the inapplicability of the Hague Convention did not
limit the district court’s authority to order the children’s immediate return. Finally, the Court
held that the district court erred in awarding the divorce decree by default because Shinichi made
an appearance through counsel, answered the complaint, and demonstrated intent to defend
against the action.
Factual and Procedural History
Appellant Shinichi Ogawa and respondent Yoko Ogawa married in Japan in 1997.
Between 1998 and 2002, the parties had three children, all born in Japan. During this time the
couple lived intermittently in the U.S. and Japan. Yoko became a permanent resident of the U.S.
and the couple bought a home in Henderson, Nevada.
Although the parties ultimately settled in Japan, in early 2003, Yoko and the children
traveled to the U.S. and she decided they should stay permanently in Henderson, Nevada. In
2004, the children returned to Japan for an alleged summer vacation. However, at the end of
summer, Sinichi told Yoko the children would be staying. The children have resided with their
father since that date.
Eight months after the children returned to Japan, Yoko filed for divorce in Nevada
district court. She also petitioned the district court for the immediate return of her children.
During a hearing, the district court noted it had subject matter jurisdiction over the custody issue,
because Nevada was the children’s “habitual residence.” 2 Although Sinichi had not been served
with any court documents, the court entered an ex parte order awarding Yoko temporary sole
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See International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11611 (1988).

custody of the children, and ordered Shinichi to return the children immediately on March 29,
2005.
Shortly after being served on January 10, 2006, Shinichi, through U.S counsel, moved to
vacate the March order. He challenged the courts subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the
custody issues. In February 2006, Yoko filed a motion for an order to show cause why Shinichi
should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with the March order directing him to return
the children to the Unites States. At a subsequent hearing on the motion, in which Shinichi
appeared through counsel, the district court confirmed its subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
the UCCJEA and ordered Shinichi to appear and show cause why he should not be held in
contempt.
On May 16, 2006 Shinichi filed an answer and countercomplaint for divorce. The district
court heard the divorce proceeding on September 20, 2006. Once again Sinichi appeared solely
through counsel. The district court declared that it would enter a default judgment against
Shinichi based on his non-appearance. The district court explained that whatever Yoko requested
in the order would be granted in the decree.
The district court entered a default divorce decree on November 22, 2006. The order gave
Yoko sole legal and physical custody and ordered that Shinichi have “no contact with the minor
children.” Furthermore, Yoko was awarded spousal and child support, the marital home, car, and
all personal property. Shinichi timely appealed.
Discussion
The issues raised on appeal include whether the district court properly (1) exercised
subject matter jurisdiction over the children; (2) relied on the Hague Convention and ordered the
children’s return; and (3) entered a default divorce decree against Shinichi.
The district court properly determined that Nevada is the children’s home state
The Court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction to enter custody
orders. Although the children had not physically been present in Nevada for eight months when
Yoko filed her complaint, their absence was expressly due to Shinichi’s wrongful extension of
what should have been a vacation. Therefore, the Court did not count the summer vacation
months in determining home state jurisdiction.
The Court noted that the UCCJEA governs subject matter jurisdiction over child custody
3
issues. The UCCJEA serves to prevent jurisdictional conflicts in child custody issues and to
deter child abduction. 4 The UCCJEA permits only one state, usually the “home state,” to have
authority to make custody determinations. 5 “Home State” is defined as the state in which a child
lived with a parent for at least six consecutive months, including any temporary absence from the
state, immediately before the child custody proceeding commenced. 6 Therefore, the Court
recognized that a “temporary absence” during the six-month time frame of home-state residency
does not extinguish state jurisdiction. 7 Thus, the Court concluded that if Nevada is either the
child’s home state when the child custody proceedings commence, or was the child’s home state
3

NEV. REV. STAT. § 125A.305 (2007).
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 101 cmt. (1997); 9 U.L.A. 657 (1999)
(explaining the UCCJEA’s purpose; see also Ruffier v. Ruffier, 190 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. App. 2006); see
generally NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 125A (2007).
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See Hart v. Kozik, 242 S.W.3d 102, 106-07 (Tex. App. 2007).
6
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125A.085 (2007).
7
See Felty v. Felty, 882 N.Y.S.2d 504, 508 (N.Y. App.Div. 2009).
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within six months before the proceeding commenced and the child is absent from Nevada, but a
parent continues to live in Nevada, Nevada courts have jurisdictional priority to make initial
child custody determinations. 1
In this case, the Court noted that substantial evidence supports the district courts finding
that the children left Nevada and traveled to Japan for a three-month summer vacation.
Consequently, pursuant to UCCJEA, the Court found Nevada to be the children’s home state
because the vacation from June through August did not interrupt the six-month pre-complaint
residency requirement.
Although the Hague Convention does not provide a basis for the district court to order the
children’s return to the U.S., the district court had authority to enter custody orders, since it had
jurisdiction over the custody dispute under the UCCJEA
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is an
international treaty that promotes the prompt return of children wrongfully taken from their state
of residence. 8 When the district court ordered the return of the children it referenced the Hague
Convention as authority. However, Japan is not a signatory to the Hague Convention; therefore,
the Court ruled it did not apply to this case. 2
Nevertheless, the Court did affirm the district court’s authority to issue the order pursuant
to the UCCJEA. Thus, it held the district court properly granted the motion for the children’s
immediate return even though the Hague Convention enforcement remedies do not apply.
Default Divorce Decree
Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) governs default procedure, and provides, “When a
party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the
clerk shall enter the party’s default.” 9
The Court concluded that default was inappropriate in this case because Shinichi
answered the complaint and appeared at the divorce hearing through counsel. 10 Therefore, the
Court concluded that the district court erred in entering default against Shinichi.
1

See NEV. REV. STAT. § 125A.305(1)(a) (2007).
42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11611 (1988).
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U.S. v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 881 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that the Hague Convention principles are applicable
only to those countries that have signed the Convention and thereby agreed to abide by its terms); Taveras v.
Taveras, 397 F. Supp. 2d 908, 912 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (acknowledging that there is no remedy under the Hague
Convention when a nonsignatory country is involved and that “hard-line view” applies because “only those
countries that are signatories have an obligation to reciprocate by affording litigants the same remedies in their
courts”); Mezo v. Elmergawi, 855 F. Supp. 59, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (same); Matter of Mohsen, 715 F. Supp. 1063,
1065 (D. Wyo. 1989) (same); see also Smita Aiyar, International Child Abductions Involving Non-Hague
Convention States: The Need for a Uniform Approach, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 277, 294-97 (2007) (discussing
remedies beyond the Hague Convention and noting that nonsignatory nations generally ignore signatory nations’
requests for the children’s return and instead apply their own laws to determine custody issues).
9
NEV. R. CIV. P .55(a).
10
See In Interest of M.M., 708 So. 2d 990, 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (providing that a trial court’s decision to
enter a default judgment against parties for failing to appear at a hearing was improper because the parties
“‘appear[ed]’ through their counsel”); Owen v. Healy, 896 A.2d 965, 967-68 (Me. 2006) (pointing out that the “fact
that a person is a party to a civil action does not in itself impose a legal obligation upon that person to be present at
trial,” and thus, when a party does not personally appear at trial, but his or her attorney does appear, a default against
that party is not appropriate); Rocky Produce, Inc. v. Frontera, 449 N.W.2d 916, 917 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)
(reversing a default judgment entered based on a civil defendant’s failure to personally appear at trial and holding
8

Conclusion
The Court concluded that, under the UCCJEA, Nevada is the children’s’ home state.
Since Nevada is the home state, the district court exercised proper authority to render custody
decisions. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the district court had authority to order the
immediate return of the children pursuant to the UCCJEA. Finally, because filed responsive
pleadings and appeared through his attorney, the Court concluded that the district court erred in
entering a default judgment against him. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s
default judgment and remanded the matter to the district court for a decision on the merits.

that, “absent a subpoena or order from the court to appear, a defendant in a civil case is not required to appear in
person for a scheduled trial”); In re Brandon A., 769 A.2d 586, 589 (R.I. 2001) (defining “an appearance as ‘[a]
coming into court as party to a suit, either in person or by attorney’”) (quoting Nisenzon v. Sadowski, 689 A.2d
1037, 1048 (R.I. 1997)); LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 778 S.W.2d 865, 865 (Tex. 1989) (concluding that if a party is
represented at trial by counsel, there is no default judgment even if the party does not personally appear); see also
State v. Sargent, 122 Nev. 210, 216, 128 P.3d 1052, 1056 (2006) (explaining, in the context of a criminal case
proceeding in the justice court, that “when the defendant files a waiver of his personal appearance and his counsel
appears at the preliminary hearing on the date and time required, the defendant’s lack of personal appearance does
not constitute a failure to appear”); Fritz Hansen A/S v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 650, 653, 6 P.3d 982, 983 (2000)
(indicating that a party may make an appearance either in person or through his or her attorney).

